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1 Introduction and discussion of applications
Matching theory studies how agents and/or objects from different sets can be matched with
each other while taking agents’ preferences into account. The theory originated in 1962 with a
celebrated paper by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), in which they proposed the Stable
Marriage Algorithm as a solution to the problem of two-sided matching. Since then, this
theory has been successfully applied to many real-world problems such as matching students
to universities, doctors to hospitals, kidney transplant patients to donors, and tenants to
houses. This chapter will focus on algorithmic as well as strategic issues of matching theory.
Many large-scale centralised allocation processes can be modelled by matching problems
where agents have preferences over one another. For example, in China, over 10 million
students apply for admission to higher education annually through a centralised process.
The inputs to the matching scheme include the students’ preferences over universities and
vice versa, and the capacities of each university.1 The task is to construct a matching that
is in some sense optimal with respect to these inputs.
Economists have long understood the problems with decentralised matching markets,
which can suffer from such undesirable properties as unravelling, congestion and exploding
offers (see Roth and Xing, 1994, for details). For centralised markets, constructing alloca-
tions by hand for large problem instances is clearly infeasible. Thus centralised mechanisms
are required for automating the allocation process.
Given the large number of agents typically involved, the computational efficiency of a
mechanism’s underlying algorithm is of paramount importance. Thus we seek polynomial-
time algorithms for the underlying matching problems. Equally important are considerations
of strategy: an agent (or a coalition of agents) may manipulate their input to the matching
scheme (e.g., by misrepresenting their true preferences, or under-reporting their capacity)
in order to try to improve their outcome. A desirable property of a mechanism is strategy-
proofness, which ensures that it is in the best interests of an agent to behave truthfully.
The study of matching problems involving preferences was begun in 1962 with the seminal
paper of Gale and Shapley (1962) who gave an efficient algorithm for the so-called Stable
Marriage problem (which involves matching men to women based on each person having
preferences over members of the opposite sex) and showed how to extend it to the College
Admissions problem, a many-to-one extension of the Stable Marriage problem which involves
allocating students to colleges based on college capacities, as well as on students’ preferences
1In fact, students are first assigned to universities and then to their programme of study within the
university; see, e.g., Zhu, 2014.
2
over colleges and vice versa. Their algorithm has come to be known as the Gale–Shapley
algorithm.
Since 1962, the study of matching problems involving preferences has grown into a large
and active research area, and numerous contributions have been made by computer scientists,
economists, and mathematicians, among others. Several monographs exclusively dealing
with this class of problems have been published (Knuth, 1976; Gusfield and Irving, 1989;
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Manlove, 2013).
A particularly appealing aspect of this research area is the range of practical applications
of matching problems, leading to real-life scenarios where efficient algorithms can be deployed
and issues of strategy can be overcome. One of the best-known examples is the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the US, which handles the annual allocation of
intending junior doctors (or residents) to hospital posts. In 2014, 40,394 aspiring junior
doctors applied via the NRMP for 29,671 available residency positions (NRMP website,
2014). The problem model is very similar to Gale and Shapley’s College Admissions problem,
and indeed an extension of the Gale–Shapley algorithm is used to construct the allocation
each year (Roth, 1984a; Roth and Peranson, 1997). Similar medical matching schemes exist
in Canada, Japan and the UK. As Roth argued, the key property for a matching to satisfy in
this context is stability, which ensures that a resident and hospital do not have the incentive
to deviate from their allocation and become matched to one another.
Similar applications arise in the context of School Choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003). For example in Boston and New York, centralised matching schemes are employed to
assign pupils to schools on the basis of the preferences of pupils (or more realistically their
parents) over schools, and pupils’ priorities for assignment to a given school (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2005a,b). A school’s priority for a pupil might include issues such as geographical
proximity and whether the pupil has a sibling at the school already, among others.
Kidney exchange (Roth et al., 2004, 2005) is another application of matching that has
grown in importance in recent years. Sometimes, a kidney patient with a willing but incom-
patible donor can swap their donor with that of another patient in a similar position. Efficient
algorithms are required to organise kidney “swaps” on the basis of information about donor
and patient compatibilities. Such swaps can involve two or more patient–donor pairs, but
usually the maximum number of pairs involved is three. Also altruistic donors can trigger
“chains” involving swaps between patient–donor pairs. These allow for a larger number of
kidney transplants (compared to those one could perform based on deceased donors only)
and thus more lives saved. Centralised clearinghouses for kidney exchange are in operation
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on a nationwide scale in a number of countries including the US (Roth et al., 2004, 2005;
Ashlagi and Roth, 2012), The Netherlands (Keizer et al., 2005) and the UK (Johnson et al.,
2008). The problem of maximising the number of kidney transplants performed through
cycles and chains is NP-hard (Abraham et al., 2007a), though algorithms based on Mixed
Integer Programming have been developed and are used to solve this problem at scale in the
countries mentioned (Abraham et al., 2007a; Dickerson et al., 2013; Manlove and O’Malley,
2012; Glorie et al., 2014).
The importance of the research area in both theoretical and practical senses was under-
lined in 2012 by the award of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel (commonly known as the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences) to Alvin Roth and
Lloyd Shapley for their work in “the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market
design”. This reflects both Shapley’s contribution to the Stable Marriage algorithm among
other theoretical advances, and Roth’s application of these results to matching markets in-
volving the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals, pupils to schools, and kidney patients
to donors. The Nobel prize rules state that the prize cannot be awarded posthumously and
hence David Gale (1921-2008) could not be honoured for his important contributions.
Matching problems involving preferences can be classified as being either bipartite or
non-bipartite. In the former case, the agents are partitioned into two disjoint sets A and
B, and the members of A have preferences over only the members of B (and possibly vice
versa). In the latter case we have one single set of agents, each of whom ranks some or all of
the others in order of preference. For space reasons we will consider only bipartite matching
problems involving preferences in this chapter.
Bipartite problems can be further categorised according to whether the preferences are
two-sided or one-sided. In the former case, members of both of the sets A and B have
preferences over one another, whilst in the latter case only the members of A have preferences
(over the members of B). Bipartite matching problems with two-sided preferences arise in
the context of assigning junior doctors to hospitals, for example, whilst one-sided preferences
arise in applications including the assignment of students to campus housing and reviewers
to conference papers.
Our treatment covers ordinal preferences (where preferences are expressed in terms of first
choice, second choice, etc.) rather than cardinal utilities (where preferences are expressed
in terms of real-numbered valuations). In their simplest form, models of kidney exchange
problems can involve dichotomous preferences (a special case of ordinal preferences, where an
agent either finds another agent acceptable or not, and is indifferent among those it does find
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acceptable), on the basis of whether a patient is compatible with a potential donor or not.
However in practice models of kidney exchange are more complex, typically involving cardinal
utilities rather than ordinal preferences, and therefore the matching problems defined in this
chapter do not encompass theoretical models of kidney exchange.
The problems considered in this chapter sit strongly within the field of computational
social choice. This field lies at the interface of economics and computer science, and our
approach will involve interleaving key aspects that have hitherto been considered by the
two communities in bodies of literature that have largely pertained to the two disciplines
separately. Such key considerations involve the existence of structural results and efficient
algorithms, and the derivation of strategy-proof mechanisms. These topics will be reviewed
in each of the cases of bipartite matching problems with two-sided and one-sided preferences.
Although space restrictions have necessarily limited our coverage, we have tried to include
the results that we feel will be of most importance to the readership of this handbook.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we focus on bipartite match-
ing problems where both sides have preferences. Here the most important property for a
matching to satisfy is stability. In Section 2.1 we define the key matching problems in this
class, most notably the Hospitals / Residents problem, and we also define stability in this
context. We then state fundamental structural and algorithmic results concerning the ex-
istence, computation, and structural properties of stable matchings, in Section 2.2. Issues
of strategy, and in particular the existence (or otherwise) of strategy-proof mechanisms, are
dealt with in Section 2.3. Next, in Section 2.4, we outline some further algorithmic results,
including decentralised algorithms for computing stable matchings, variants of the Hospitals
/ Residents problem involving ties and couples, and many-to-many extensions.
Bipartite matching problems where only one side of the market has preferences are consid-
ered in Section 3. The fundamental problems in this class are the House Allocation problem
and its extension to Housing Markets. We define these problems together with key properties
of matchings, including Pareto optimality and membership of the core, in Section 3.1. Sec-
tion 3.2 describes some important mechanisms that can be used to produce Pareto optimal
matchings and matchings in the core. Strategy-proofness is considered in Section 3.3, and
then further algorithmic results are described in Section 3.4, including the computation of
maximum Pareto optimal, popular, and profile-based optimal matchings.
Finally, in Section 4 we give some concluding remarks and list some further sources of
reading.
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2 Two-sided preferences
2.1 Introduction and preliminary definitions
The Hospitals / Residents problem2 (hr) (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989;
Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Manlove, 2008) was first defined by Gale and Shapley in their
seminal paper “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage” (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
An instance I of hr involves a set R = {r1, . . . , rn1} of residents and a set H =
{h1, . . . , hn2} of hospitals. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a positive integer capacity, denoted
by cj, indicating the number of posts that hj has. Also there is a set E ⊆ R×H of accept-
able resident–hospital pairs. Let m = |E|. Each resident ri ∈ R has an acceptable set of
hospitals A(ri), where A(ri) = {hj ∈ H : (ri, hj) ∈ E}. Similarly each hospital hj ∈ H has
an acceptable set of residents A(hj), where A(hj) = {ri ∈ R : (ri, hj) ∈ E}.
The agents in I are the residents and hospitals in R ∪ H. Each agent ak ∈ R ∪ H has
a preference list in which she/it ranks A(ak) in strict order. Given any resident ri ∈ R,
and given any hospitals hj, hk ∈ H, ri is said to prefer hj to hk if {hj, hk} ⊆ A(ri) and hj
precedes hk on ri’s preference list; the prefers relation is defined similarly for a hospital.
An assignment M in I is a subset of E. If (ri, hj) ∈ M , ri is said to be assigned to
hj, and hj is assigned ri. For each ak ∈ R ∪ H, the set of assignees of ak in M is denoted
by M(ak). If ri ∈ R and M(ri) = ∅, ri is said to be unassigned, otherwise ri is assigned.
Similarly, a hospital hj ∈ H is undersubscribed or full according as |M(hj)| is less than or
equal to cj, respectively. A matching M in I is an assignment such that |M(ri)| ≤ 1 for each
ri ∈ R and |M(hj)| ≤ cj for each hj ∈ H. For notational convenience, given a matching M
and a resident ri ∈ R such that M(ri) 6= ∅, where there is no ambiguity the notation M(ri)
is also used to refer to the single member of the set M(ri).
Given an instance I of hr and a matching M , a pair (ri, hj) ∈ E\M blocks M (or is a
blocking pair for M) if (i) ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri) and (ii) hj is undersubscribed
or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj). M is said to be stable if it admits no blocking
pair. If a resident–hospital pair (ri, hj) belongs to some stable matching in I, ri is called a
stable partner of hj and vice versa.
2The Hospitals / Residents problem is sometimes referred to as the College (or University or Stable)
Admissions problem, or the Stable Assignment problem.
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Example 1 (hr instance). Consider the following hr instance:
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : 1 : r3 r2 r1 r4
r2 : h1 h2 h3 h2 : 2 : r2 r3 r1 r4
r3 : h2 h1 h3 h3 : 1 : r2 r3
r4 : h2 h1
Here, r1 prefers h1 to h2 and does not find h3 acceptable. Also, h1 has capacity 1 and prefers
r3 to r2, etc. M = {(r2, h1), (r3, h2), (r4, h2)} is a matching in which each resident is assigned
except for r1, and both h1 and h2 are full while h3 is undersubscribed. M is not stable
because (r1, h2) is a blocking pair.
The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi) (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Knuth,
1976; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Irving, 2008) is an important
special case of hr in which cj = 1 for all hj ∈ H, and residents and hospitals are more
commonly referred to as men and women respectively. The classical Stable Marriage problem
(sm) is the restriction of smi in which n1 = n2 and E = R×H.
Finally, the School Choice problem (sc) (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 2003) is a one-sided preference version of hr where students and schools replace
residents and hospitals respectively, and schools are endowed with priorities over students
instead of preferences. A school’s priority ranking over students may reflect a school district’s
policy choice (e.g., by giving students who are within walking distance or have a sibling in
the same school a higher priority) or they may be based on other factors (e.g., grades in
an entrance exam, time spent on a waiting list, etc.). For sc, schools are not considered
to be economic agents: they neither strategise nor is their welfare measured and taken into
account. Many results can easily be translated from hr to sc, but often the interpretation
changes. For instance, the notion of stability can be interpreted as the elimination of justified
envy (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999): a student can justifiably envy the assignment of another
student to a school if he likes that school better than his own assignment and he has a higher
priority (with a lower priority, envy might be present as well but is not justifiable). Two
recent and exhaustive surveys on school choice have been written by Abdulkadirog˘lu (2013)
and Pathak (2011).
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2.2 Classical results: stability and Gale–Shapley algorithms
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that every instance I of hr admits at least one stable
matching. Their proof of this result was constructive, i.e., they described a linear-time
algorithm for finding a stable matching in I. Their algorithm is known as the resident-
oriented Gale–Shapley algorithm (or RGS algorithm for short), since it involves residents
applying to hospitals. Given an instance of hr,
(1) at the first step of the RGS algorithm, every resident applies to her favourite acceptable
hospital. For each hospital hj, the cj acceptable applicants who have the highest ranks
according to hj’s preference list (or all acceptable applicants if there are fewer than cj)
are placed on the waiting list of hj, and all others are rejected;
(l) at the l-th step of the RGS algorithm, those applicants who were rejected at step l − 1
apply to their next best acceptable hospital. For each hospital hj, the cj acceptable
applicants among the new applicants and those on the waiting list who have the highest
ranks according to hj’s preference list (or all acceptable applicants if there are fewer than
cj) are placed on the waiting list of hj, and all others are rejected.
Example 2 (RGS algorithm). We now illustrate an execution of the RGS algorithm for the
hr instance shown in Example 1. In the first step, each of r1 and r2 applies to h1, and each
of r3 and r4 applies to h2. Whilst h2 accepts each of r3 and r4, h1 can only accept r2 (from
among r1 and r2). Thus r1 is rejected by h1 and applies to the next hospital in his preference
list, namely h2, at the second step. At this point, h2 accepts r1, keeps r3, and rejects r4. In
the third step, r4 applies to h1 and is rejected again. Now the algorithm terminates since
each resident is either assigned to a hospital or has applied to every hospital on his preference
list. The resulting matching is thus M ′ = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h2)}, and the reader may
verify that M ′ is stable.
The RGS algorithm is well-defined and terminates with the unique resident-optimal stable
matching Ma that assigns to each resident the best hospital that she could achieve in any
stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in every stable matching (Gale
and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.3).
It is instructive to give a short sketch of the proof illustrating why Ma is stable. For,
consider any resident ri and suppose that hj is any hospital that ri prefers to Ma(ri) (if ri
is assigned in Ma) or hj is any hospital that ri finds acceptable (if ri is unassigned in Ma).
Then ri applied to hj during the execution of the RGS algorithm, and was rejected by hj.
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This could only happen if hj was full and preferred its worst assignee to hj at that point.
But hj cannot subsequently lose any residents and indeed can only potentially gain better
assignees. Hence in Ma, hj is full and prefers its worst assigned resident to ri. Thus (ri, hj)
cannot block Ma, and since ri and hj were arbitrary, Ma is stable.
Furthermore, Ma is worst-possible for the hospitals in a precise sense: if M is any other
stable matching then every hospital hj ∈ H prefers each resident in M(hj) to each resident
in Ma(hj)\M(hj) (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.6.5).
Theorem 3 (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989). Given an hr instance,
the RGS algorithm constructs, in O(m) time, the unique resident-optimal stable matching,
where m is the number of acceptable resident–hospital pairs.
A counterpart of the RGS algorithm, known as the hospital-oriented Gale–Shapley algo-
rithm, or HGS algorithm for short, involves hospitals offering posts to residents. The HGS
algorithm terminates with the unique hospital-optimal stable matching Mz. In this matching,
every full hospital hj ∈ H is assigned its cj best stable partners, whilst every undersubscribed
hospital is assigned the same set of residents in every stable matching (Gusfield and Irving,
1989, Sec. 1.6.2). Furthermore, Mz assigns to each resident the worst hospital that she could
achieve in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in every stable
matching (Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Theorem 1.6.1).
Theorem 4 (Gusfield and Irving, 1989). Given an instance of hr, the HGS algorithm
constructs, in O(m) time, the unique hospital-optimal stable matching, where m is the number
of acceptable resident–hospital pairs.
Note that the RGS / HGS algorithms are often referred to as deferred acceptance algo-
rithms by economists (Roth, 2008).
It is easy to check that for Example 2, Ma = M
′ = Mz. In general there may be other
stable matchings — possibly exponentially many (Irving and Leather, 1986) — between the
two extremes given by Ma and Mz. However some key structural properties hold regarding
unassigned residents and undersubscribed hospitals with respect to all stable matchings in
I, as follows.
Theorem 5 (Rural Hospitals Theorem: Roth 1984a; Gale and Sotomayor 1985; Roth 1986).
For a given instance of hr, the following properties hold:
1. the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings;
2. each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings;
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3. any hospital that is undersubscribed in one stable matching is assigned exactly the same
set of residents in all stable matchings.
The term “Rural Hospitals Theorem” stems from the tendency of rural hospitals to have
problems in recruiting residents to fill all available slots. The theorem’s name then indicates
the importance of the result to the rural hospitals’ recruitment problem: under stability
one can never choose matchings to help undersubscribed rural hospitals to recruit more or
better residents. Additional background to the Rural Hospitals Theorem for hr is given by
Gusfield and Irving (1989, Sec. 1.6.4).
A classical result in stable matching theory states that, for a given instance of sm, the
set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice; Knuth (1976) attributed this result to
John Conway (see also Gusfield and Irving, 1989, Sec. 1.3.1). In fact such a structure is
also present for the set of stable matchings in a given instance I of hr (Gusfield and Irving,
1989, Sec. 1.6.5). To describe this structure, we will define some preliminary notation and
terminology.
Let S denote the set of stable matchings in I and let M,M ′ ∈ S. We say that ri ∈ R
prefers M to M ′ if ri is assigned in both M and M ′, and ri prefers M(ri) to M ′(ri). Also,
we say that ri is indifferent between M and M
′ if either (i) ri is unassigned in both M and
M ′, or (ii) ri is assigned in both M and M ′, and M(ri) = M ′(ri). Then, M dominates M ′,
denoted M M ′, if each resident either prefers M to M ′, or is indifferent between them.
For M,M ′ ∈ S we denote by M ∧M ′ (respectively M ∨M ′) the set of resident-hospital
pairs in which either (i) ri is unassigned if she is unassigned in both M and M
′, or (ii) ri is
given the better (respectively poorer) of her partners in M and M ′ if she is assigned in both
stable matchings. It turns out that each of M ∧M ′ and M ∨M ′ is a stable matching in
I, representing the join and the meet of M and M ′ respectively (Gusfield and Irving, 1989,
Sec. 1.6.5). These operations give rise to a lattice structure for S, as the following result
indicates.
Theorem 6 (Gusfield and Irving, 1989). Let I be an instance of hr, and let S be the set of
stable matchings in I. Then (S,) forms a distributive lattice, with M ∧M ′ representing the
meet, and M ∨M ′ the join, for two stable matchings M,M ′ ∈ S, where  is the dominance
partial order on S.
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2.3 Strategic results: strategy-proofness
Note that both the RGS and HGS algorithms are described in terms of agents taking actions
based on their preference lists (one side proposes and the other side tentatively accepts
or rejects these proposals). However, unless agents have an incentive to truthfully report
their preferences, any preference-based requirement (such as stability) might lose some of its
meaning. The following theorem demonstrates that in general, stability is not compatible
with the requirement that for all agents truth telling is a weakly dominant strategy (strategy-
proofness).
To be more precise, we call a function that assigns a matching to each instance of hr (or
smi / sm) a mechanism. A mechanism that assigns only stable matchings is called stable.
The mechanism that always assigns the resident-optimal (hospital-optimal) stable matching
is called the RGS (HGS ) mechanism.
A mechanism for which no single agent can ever benefit from misrepresenting her/its pref-
erences is called strategy-proof , i.e., in game-theoretic terms, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each agent to report her/its true preference list. If we restrict preference misrepresenta-
tions to one type of agents only, we obtain the one-sided versions of strategy-proofness: a
mechanism for which no single resident can ever benefit from misrepresenting her preferences
is called strategy-proof for residents. Strategy-proofness for hospitals is similarly defined.
Theorem 7 (Impossibility Theorem: Roth 1982a). There exists no mechanism for smi that
is stable and strategy-proof.
As smi is a special case of hr, Theorem 7 clearly extends to the hr case. The proof of
Theorem 7 can be shown with the following example.
Example 8 (Impossibility). Consider the following instance:
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : r2 r1
r2 : h2 h1 h2 : r1 r2
The two stable matchings for this instance are Ma = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} and Mz =
{(r1, h2), (r2, h1)}. Assume that the mechanism picks stable matching Ma. Then, if h1
pretended that only r2 is acceptable, Ma is not stable anymore and the stable mechanism
would have to pick the only remaining stable matching Mz, which h1 would prefer; a con-
tradiction to strategy-proofness. Similarly, if the mechanism picks stable matching Mz, r1
could manipulate by declaring h1 uniquely acceptable.
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The intuition behind this impossibility result is that an agent who is assigned to a stable
partner that is not her/its best stable partner can improve her/its outcome by truncating the
preference list just below the best stable partner: this unilateral manipulation will result in
the assignment of the best stable partner to the agent who misrepresented her/its preference
list. Alcalde and Barbera` (1994) and Takagi and Serizawa (2010) further strengthened the
impossibility result by considerably weakening the stability requirement.
On the positive side, stable mechanisms that respect strategy-proofness for all residents
exist.
Theorem 9 (Roth, 1985). The RGS mechanism for hr is strategy-proof for residents.
As hr is a generalisation of each of sm and smi, clearly Theorem 9 also holds in these
latter contexts. This theorem for hr is an extension of an earlier corresponding theorem
for sm (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982b). Strategy-proofness for all residents also
turns out to be a key property in characterising the RGS mechanism (Ehlers and Klaus,
2014): almost all real-life mechanisms used in variants of hr (including sc) — including the
large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms — satisfy a set of
simple and intuitive properties, but once strategy-proofness is added to these properties, the
RGS mechanism is the only one surviving (and characterised by the respective properties
including strategy-proofness). For sc, since residents (aka students) are the only economic
agents, Theorem 9 in fact establishes a possibility result. For hr, the negative result of
Theorem 7 persists even if restricting attention only to hospitals.
Theorem 10 (Roth, 1986). There exists no mechanism for hr that is stable and strategy-
proof for hospitals.
This result implies that even when the HGS mechanism is used, hospitals might have an
incentive to misrepresent their preferences.
Once the incompatibility of stability and strategy-proofness is established (Theorems 7
and 10), the question arises as to whether we can at least find stable mechanisms that are
resistant to strategic behaviour, meaning that it is computationally difficult (i.e., NP-hard)
for agents to behave strategically. This approach is typical in voting theory, which is the
subject of Chapter 6 (Conitzer and Walsh, 2015) on Barriers to Manipulation, since no voting
rule is strategy-proof (Arrow et al., 2002; Bartholdi et al., 1989). It is possible to exploit
such results to define stable mechanisms that are resistant to strategic behaviour. Pini et al.
(2011) showed how to take voting rules that are resistant to strategic behaviour and use
them to define stable mechanisms with the same property.
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Besides worst-case analysis, we may also consider the occurrence and impact of strategic
behaviour when stable matching mechanisms are used in real-world instances of hr. Roth
and Peranson (1999) showed that, for data from the NRMP, only a few participants could
improve their outcomes by changing their preference list. They also showed via simulations
that the opportunities for manipulation diminish when the instances of hr grow larger
in population. Since then, various articles have provided theoretical explanations for this
phenomenon for large population instances of smi or hr (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005;
Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2014).
2.4 Further algorithmic results
2.4.1 Decentralised algorithms for smi
In Section 2.2 we described the Gale–Shapley algorithm, which can be regarded as a cen-
tralised algorithm for hr. There has also been much interest in the study of decentralised
algorithms for finding stable matchings. In particular, Roth and Vande Vate (1990) studied
a mechanism for smi that involves starting from some initial matching M0 (which need not
be stable) and constructing a random sequence of matchings M0,M1,M2 . . . , where for each
i ≥ 1, Mi is obtained from Mi−1 by satisfying a blocking pair (m,w) of Mi−1 (that is, the
partners of m and w in Mi−1, if they exist, are both single in Mi, and (m,w) is added to
Mi). The blocking pair that is satisfied at each step is chosen at random, subject to the
constraint that there is a positive probability that any particular blocking pair (from among
those that exist at a given step) is chosen. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) showed that this
random sequence converges to a stable matching with probability 1. The algorithm under-
lying their result became known as the Roth-Vande Vate Mechanism. The special case of
this mechanism in which M0 = ∅ (and some other subtle modifications are made) has been
referred to as the Random Order Mechanism (Ma, 1996).
When satisfying a blocking pair (m,w), if the ‘divorcees’ (M(w) and M(m)) are required
to marry one another then the situation is very different. In this case there are sm instances
and initial matchings M0 such that it is not possible to transform M0 to a stable matching
by satisfying a sequence of blocking pairs (Tamura, 1993; Tan and Su, 1995).
Ackermann et al. (2011) categorised decentralised algorithms for smi into better response
dynamics and best response dynamics. The former description applies to mechanisms that
are based on satisfying blocking pairs, whilst the latter refers to a more specific mechanism
where, should a blocking pair be satisfied, it is the best blocking pair for the active agent
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(i.e., the agent who makes the proposal). The authors also considered random better response
dynamics and random best response dynamics. In the former case, a blocking pair is chosen
uniformly at random, whilst in the latter case, a blocking pair that corresponds to the
best blocking pair for a given proposer is selected uniformly at random. The authors gave
exponential lower bounds for the convergence time of both approaches in uncoordinated
markets.
Both sequential and parallel local search algorithms, based on the approach of Roth
and Vande Vate (1990), have been implemented and tested on large smi problem instances,
showing a very efficient behaviour (Gelain et al., 2013; Munera et al., 2015).
2.4.2 Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties
In the context of centralised clearinghouses for junior doctor allocation, often large hospitals
have many applicants and may find it difficult to produce a strict ranking over all these
residents. In practice a hospital may be indifferent between batches of residents, represented
by ties in its preference list. This naturally leads to the Hospitals / Residents problem with
Ties (hrt), the generalisation of hr in which the preference lists of both residents and
hospitals can contain ties.
In the hrt context, several stability definitions have been formulated in the literature,
with varying degrees of strength. A matching M is weakly stable if there is no resident–
hospital pair (r, h), such that by coming together, each would be strictly better off than
their current situation in M . In the case of strong stability, in a blocking pair (r, h) it is
enough for one of (r, h) to be strictly better off, whilst the other must be no worse off, by
forming a partnership. Finally, in the case of super-stability, all we require is that each of
(r, h) must be no worse off.
Example 11 (hrt instance). To illustrate these stability concepts, we insert some ties into
the preference lists in the hr instance shown in Example 1. The resulting instance of hrt is
r1 : h1 h2 h1 : 1 : r3 (r2 r1) r4
r2 : h1 h2 h3 h2 : 2 : r2 (r3 r1 r4)
r3 : h2 (h1 h3) h3 : 1 : r2 r3
r4 : h2 h1
Here, parentheses indicate ties in the preference lists, so for example, r3 prefers h2 to
each of h1 and h3, and is indifferent between the latter two hospitals. The matchings
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{(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h2)} and {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r4, h2)} are both weakly stable, but
the instance admits no strongly-stable matching, and hence no super-stable matching either.
We continue by considering algorithmic results for hrt under weak stability. Firstly, an
hrt instance is bound to admit a weakly stable matching, and such a matching can be found
in linear time (Irving et al., 2000). Recall from Theorem 5 that all stable matchings in an hr
instance have the same size. However in the case of hrt, weakly stable matchings may have
different sizes, as illustrated by Example 11. Often in the case of centralised clearinghouses,
an important consideration is to match as many participants as possible. This motivates
max hrt, the problem of finding a maximum weakly stable matching, given an hrt instance.
This problem is NP-hard (Iwama et al., 1999; Manlove et al., 2002) even if each hospital has
capacity 1, and also even under severe restrictions on the number, length and positions of
the ties (Manlove et al., 2002). A succession of approximation algorithms has been proposed
in the literature for various restrictions of max hrt, culminating in the best current bound
of 3/2 for the general problem (McDermid, 2009; Kira´ly, 2013; Paluch, 2014).
Although an hrt instance I is bound to admit a weakly stable matching as mentioned
above, by contrast a strongly stable matching or a super-stable matching in I may not exist
(Irving et al., 2000, 2003). However there is an efficient algorithm to find a strongly stable
matching or report that none exists (Kavitha et al., 2007). A faster and simpler algorithm
exists in the case of super-stability (Irving et al., 2000). Moreover an analogue of Theorem
5 holds in hrt under each of the strong stability and super-stability criteria (Scott, 2005;
Irving et al., 2000).
2.4.3 Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples
Another variant of hr that is motivated by practical applications arises in the presence of
couples. These are pairs of residents who wish to be jointly assigned to hospitals via a
common preferences list over pairs of hospitals, typically in order to be geographically close
to one another. Each couple (ri, rj) has a preference list over a subset of H ×H, where each
pair (hp, hq) on this list represents the joint assignment of ri to hp and rj to hq. (There may
be single residents in addition, as before.) We thus obtain the Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples (hrc).
Relative to a suitable stability definition, Roth (1984a) showed that an hrc instance need
not admit a stable matching. Ng and Hirschberg (1988) and Ronn (1990) independently
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showed that the problem of deciding whether an hrc instance admits a stable matching is
NP-complete, even if each hospital has capacity 1 and there are no single residents.
McDermid and Manlove (2010) considered a variant of hrc in which each resident
(whether single or in a couple) has a preference list over individual hospitals, and the joint
preference list of each couple (ri, rj) is consistent with the individual lists of ri and rj in a
precise sense. Relative to Roth’s stability definition (Roth, 1984a), they showed that the
problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete. However if instead we
enforce classical (Gale–Shapley) stability on a given matching relative to the individual lists
of residents, then the problem of finding a stable matching or reporting that none exists is
solvable in polynomial time (McDermid and Manlove, 2010).
Biro´ et al. (2011) developed a range of heuristics for the problem of finding a stable
matching or reporting that none exists in a given hrc instance, and subjected them to a
detailed empirical evaluation based on randomly-generated data. They found that a stable
matching is very likely to exist for instances where the ratio of couples to single residents is
small and of the magnitude typically found in practical applications.
Ashlagi et al. (2014) studied large random matching markets with couples. They intro-
duced a new matching algorithm and showed that if the number of couples grows slower than
the size of the market, a stable matching will be found with high probability. If however,
the number of couples grows at a linear rate, with constant probability (not depending on
the market size), no stable matching exists.
Further results for hrc are described in the survey paper of Biro´ and Klijn (2013).
2.4.4 Many-to-many stable matching
Many-to-many extensions of sm (and by implication hr) have been considered in the litera-
ture (Roth, 1984b; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990; Sotomayor, 1999; Ba¨ıou and Balinski, 2000;
Fleiner, 2003; Mart´ınez et al., 2004; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006; Bansal et al., 2007; Ko-
jima and U¨nver, 2008; Eirinakis et al., 2012, 2013; Klijn and Yazıcı, 2014). These matching
problems tend to be described in the context of assigning workers to firms, where each agent
can be multiply assigned (up to a given capacity). We will discuss the two main models of
many-to-many matching in the literature.
The first version we consider, which we refer to as the Workers / Firms problem, Ver-
sion 1, denoted by wf-1, involves each worker ranking in strict order of preference a set of
individual acceptable firms, and vice versa for each firm. Ba¨ıou and Balinski (2000) gen-
eralised the stability definition for sm to the wf-1 case. They showed that every instance
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I of wf-1 has a stable matching and such a matching can be found in O(n2) time, where
n = max{n1, n2}, n1 is the number of workers and n2 is the number of firms in I. They also
generalised Theorems 5 and 6 to the wf-1 context. Additional algorithms have been given
for computing stable matchings with various optimality properties in wf-1 (Bansal et al.,
2007; Eirinakis et al., 2012, 2013).
In the second version, which we refer to as the Workers / Firms problem, Version 2,
denoted by wf-2, each worker ranks in strict order of preference acceptable subsets of firms,
and vice versa for each firm. Two main forms of stability have been studied in the context
of wf-2, namely pairwise stability and setwise stability.
A matching M in a wf-2 instance is pairwise stable (Roth, 1984b) if it cannot be un-
dermined by a single worker–firm pair acting together. A wf-2 instance need not admit a
pairwise stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Example 2.7). However Roth (1984b)
proved that, given an instance of wf-2 where every agent’s preference list satisfies so-called
substitutability (Kelso and Crawford, 1982), a pairwise stable matching always exists, and
he gave an algorithm for finding one. Mart´ınez et al. (2004) gave an algorithm for finding
all pairwise stable matchings.
A more powerful definition of stability is setwise stability. Informally, a matching M is
setwise stable (Sotomayor, 1999) if it cannot be undermined by a coalition of workers and
firms acting together. More precisely, several definitions of setwise stability have been given
in the literature (Sotomayor, 1999; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006; Konishi and U¨nver, 2006);
the various alternatives were formally defined and analysed by Klaus and Walzl (2009).
Bansal et al. (2007) noted that, generally speaking, wf-1 has been studied mainly by the
computer science community, whilst the economics community has mainly focused on wf-2.
One reason for this is that wf-2 suffers from the drawback that the length of an agent’s
preference list is in the worst case exponential in the number of agents. A consequence of
this is that the practical applicability of any algorithm for wf-2 would be severely limited
in general, however this problem does not arise with wf-1.
3 One-sided preferences
3.1 Introduction and preliminary definitions
Many economists and game theorists, and increasingly computer scientists in recent years,
have studied the problem of allocating a setH of indivisible goods among a set A of applicants
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Deng et al., 2003; Fekete et al.,
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2003). Each applicant ai may have ordinal preferences over a subset of H (the acceptable
goods for ai). Many models have considered the case where there is no monetary transfer.
In the literature the situation in which each applicant initially owns one good is known
as a Housing Market (hm)3 (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977; Roth,
1982a). When there are no initial property rights, we obtain the House Allocation problem
(ha) (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Zhou, 1990; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998). A
mixed model, in which a subset of applicants initially owns a good has also been studied
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999).
House Allocation problems
Formally, an instance I of the House Allocation problem (ha) comprises a set A =
{a1, a2, . . . , an1} of applicants and a set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hn2} of houses. The agents in
I are the applicants and houses in A∪H. There is a set E ⊆ A×H of acceptable applicant–
house pairs. Let m = |E|. Each applicant ai ∈ A has an acceptable set of houses A(ai),
where A(ai) = {hj ∈ H : (ai, hj) ∈ E}. Similarly each house hj ∈ H has an acceptable set
of applicants A(hj), where A(hj) = {ai ∈ A : (ai, hj) ∈ E}.
Each applicant ai ∈ A has a preference list in which she ranks A(ai) in strict order.
Given any applicant ai ∈ A, and given any houses hj, hk ∈ H, ai is said to prefer hj to hk if
{hj, hk} ⊆ A(ai), and hj precedes hk on ai’s preference list. Houses do not have preference
lists over applicants, and it is essentially this feature that distinguishes ha from smi.
ha is a very general problem model and any application domain having an underlying
matching problem that is bipartite, where agents in only one of the sets have preferences
over the other, can be viewed as an instance of ha. These include the problems of allocating
graduates to trainee positions, students to projects, professors to offices, clients to servers,
etc. The literature concerning ha has largely described this problem model in terms of
assigning applicants to houses, so for consistency we also adopt this terminology.
An assignment M in I is a subset of E. The definitions of the terms assigned to, assigned,
unassigned and assignees relative to M are analogous to the same definitions in the hr case
(see Section 2.1). A matching M in I is an assignment such that, for each pk ∈ A ∪ H,
the set of assignees of pk in M , denoted by M(pk), satisfies |M(pk)| ≤ 1. For notational
convenience, as in the hr case, if pk is assigned in M then where there is no ambiguity the
notation M(pk) is also used to refer to the single member of the set M(pk). Let M denote
the set of matchings in I.
3This problem is also referred to as the House-swapping Game in the literature.
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Given two matchings M and M ′ in M, we say that an applicant ai ∈ A prefers M ′ to
M if either (i) ai is assigned in M
′ and unassigned in M , or (ii) ai is assigned in both M
and M ′, and ai prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). We say that M ′ Pareto dominates M if (i) some
applicant prefers M ′ to M and (ii) no applicant prefers M to M ′. A matching M ∈ M is
Pareto optimal if there is no matching M ′ ∈ M that Pareto dominates M . Intuitively M
is Pareto optimal if no applicant ai can be better off without requiring another applicant aj
to be worse off. For example, M is not Pareto optimal if two applicants could improve by
swapping the houses that they are assigned to in M .
Housing Markets
An instance I of a Housing Market (hm) comprises an ha instance I where n1 = n2, together
with a matching M0 in I (the initial endowment) such that |M0| = n1. A matching M in
I is individually rational if, for each applicant ai ∈ A, either ai prefers M(ai) to M0(ai), or
M(ai) = M0(ai). Since we are only interested in individually rational matchings, we assume
that M0(ai) is the last house on ai’s preference list, for each ai ∈ A. Clearly then, any
individually rational matching M in I satisfies |M | = n1.
The notion of Pareto optimality in ha is closely related to the concept of core matchings
in the hm context (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977): let I be an instance of hm where M0 is
the initial endowment, and let M be an individually rational matching in I. Let M ′ be a
matching in I, and let S be the set of applicants who are assigned in M ′. Then M ′ weakly
blocks M with respect to the coalition S if:
(i) the members of the coalition are only allowed to improve by exchanging their own
resources (via their initial endowmentM0): {M ′(ai) : ai ∈ S} = {M0(ai) : ai ∈ S};
(ii) some member of the coalition ai ∈ S is better off in M ′: some ai ∈ S prefers
M ′(ai) to M(ai);
(iii) no member of the coalition ai ∈ S is worse off in M ′ than in M : no ai ∈ S prefers
M(ai) to M
′(ai).
M is a strict core matching , or M is in the strict core, if there is no other matching in I
that weakly blocks M . Also M ′ strongly blocks M with respect to S if Condition (i) above is
satisfied, and in addition, every ai ∈ S prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). M is a weak core matching ,
or M is in the weak core, if there is no other matching in I that strongly blocks M .
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Note that M is Pareto optimal if and only if M is not weakly blocked by any matching
M ′ such that |M ′| = n1 (here the coalition comprises all applicants and is referred to as the
grand coalition). Hence a strict core matching is Pareto optimal.
Example 12 (hm instance). Consider the following hm instance in which the initial endow-
ment is M0 = {(a1, h4), (a2, h3), (a3, h2), (a4, h1)}.
a1 : h1 h2 h3 h4
a2 : h1 h2 h4 h3
a3 : h4 h1 h3 h2
a4 : h4 h3 h2 h1
Now define the matchings M = {(a1, h4), (a2, h3), (a3, h1), (a4, h2)}, M ′ =
{(a1, h3), (a2, h2), (a3, h4), (a4, h1)} and M ′′ = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)}. Then M ′
strongly blocks M with respect to the coalition S = {a1, a2, a3}, whilst M ′′ is a strict core
matching and hence Pareto optimal.
We call a function that assigns a matching to each instance of ha (or hm) a mechanism.
A mechanism that assigns only Pareto optimal matchings is called Pareto optimal.
3.2 Classical structural and algorithmic results
House Allocation problems
All Pareto optimal matchings can be constructed using a classical algorithm called the
Serial (SD) Dictatorship Algorithm (see Theorem 14). For any fixed order of applicants
f = (i1, i2, ..., in1), the SD algorithm is a straightforward greedy algorithm that takes each
applicant in turn and assigns her to the most-preferred available house on her preference list.
The associated mechanism is called the Serial Dictatorship (SD) mechanism. The order in
which the applicants are processed will, in general, affect the outcome. If a uniform lottery
is used in order to determine the applicant ordering, then we obtain a random mechanism
called the Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism or RSD mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 1998).
Often, the fixed order of applicants used for the SD mechanism is determined in some
objective way. Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Example 4.3) remark that when the United States
Naval Academy matches graduating students to their first posts as Naval Officers using an
approach based on the SD algorithm, students are considered in non-decreasing order of
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graduation results. Clearly the SD algorithm may be implemented to execute in O(m) time
(m being the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs).
Strictly speaking RSD produces a probability distribution over matchings, and its out-
put can be regarded as a bi-stochastic n1 × n2 matrix M in which entry (i, j) gives the
probability of applicant ai receiving house hj. Independently, Aziz et al. (2013) and Saban
and Sethuraman (2013) proved that computing M is #P-complete. Saban and Sethuraman
(2013) also proved the surprising result that determining whether a given entry (i, j) in
M has positive probability is NP-complete. This implies NP-completeness for the problem
of determining whether, given an applicant ai and house hj, there exists a Pareto optimal
matching containing (ai, hj).
Krysta et al. (2014) gave an O(n21γ) strategy-proof adaptation of RSD to the more general
extension of ha in which preference lists may include ties, where γ is the maximum length
of a tie in any applicants preference list.
Housing Markets
For a somewhat more general housing market model that allows for indifferences in pref-
erence lists, Shapley and Scarf (1974) showed that the weak core is always non-empty by
constructing a weak core matching using Gale’s Top Trading Cycles or TTC algorithm (the
authors attributed the now famous TTC algorithm to David Gale). They also showed that
the weak core matching constructed is a competitive allocation,4 the strict core may be empty
and the non-empty weak core may exceed the (not necessarily singleton) set of competitive
allocations. Note that for our housing market model with strict preferences, the weak and
the strict core coincide. Given an instance of hm with initial endowment M0,
(1) at the first step of the TTC algorithm, every applicant points to the owner of her favourite
house (possibly to herself). Since there are finitely many applicants, there is at least one
cycle (where a cycle is an ordered list (i1, i2, ..., ik), 1 ≤ k ≤ n1, of applicants with each
applicant pointing to the next applicant in the list and applicant aik pointing to applicant
ai1 ; k = 1 is the special case of a self-loop where an applicant points to herself). In each
cycle the implied cyclical exchange of houses is implemented and the algorithm continues
with the remaining applicants and houses;
4While housing markets are modelled as pure exchange economies, a competitive allocation of a housing
market can be defined using fiat money. Then, an allocation is competitive if there exists a price for each
house such that, by selling his house at the given price, each agent can afford to buy his most-preferred
house (i.e., market clearance ensues).
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(l) at the l-th step of the TTC algorithm, every remaining applicant points to the owner of
her favourite remaining house (possibly to herself). Again, there is at least one cycle and
in each cycle the implied cyclical exchange of houses is implemented and the algorithm
continues with the remaining applicants and houses, and terminates when no applicants
remain.
Note that there is an equivalent two-sided formulation of the TTC algorithm in which agents
point to houses as specified above and houses will always point to their owners. The TTC
algorithm can be implemented to run in O(m) time (m being the number of acceptable
applicant–house pairs) (Abraham et al., 2004). Roth and Postlewaite (1977) demonstrated
that the matching found by the TTC algorithm is the unique strict core allocation as well
as the unique competitive allocation. The mechanism that assigns to each instance of hm
the strict core matching obtained by the TTC algorithm is called the Core Mechanism or
sometimes simply the Core.
Example 13. We apply the TTC algorithm to the hm instance shown in Example 12.
The initial directed graph has four nodes (representing all applicants) where each applicants
points to the owner (in M0) of its most preferred house. Hence there is a directed arc from
a1 to a4, from a2 to a4, from a3 to a1, and from a4 to a1. Since there is a cycle involving a1
and a4, we swap their houses, and thus a1 receives h1 and a4 receives h4. Now we delete a1
and a4 from the graph, as well as their houses from the hm instance. We are thus left with
a2 and a3, with an arc from a2 to a3 (since after having deleted h1, the most preferred house
of a2 is h2, owned by a3) and similarly an arc from a3 to a2. Thus we swap their houses and
the algorithm stops, returning the matching M ′′ = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2), (a3, h3), (a4, h4)} as in
Example 12.
Recall that the only difference between an instance of ha and an instance of hm is
that in the latter case an initial endowment matching M0 is given as well. Hence, we
could define a mechanism for ha that fixes an initial endowment matching Mf and then
uses the Core mechanism for the obtained instance of hm. We call such a mechanism a
Core from Fixed Endowments or CFE mechanism. If now a uniform lottery is used in
order to determine the initial endowment matching, then we obtain a random mechanism
called the Core from Random Endowments or CRE mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
1998). Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1998) proved that the two random mechanisms we have
introduced are equivalent.
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Theorem 14 (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998). 1. All SD mechanisms for ha are
Pareto optimal. For each Pareto optimal matching M of an instance of ha, there
exists an order of applicants such that the corresponding SD mechanism assigns M .
2. All Core mechanisms for hm are Pareto optimal. For each Pareto optimal matching
M of an instance of ha, there exists an initial endowment matching Mf such that the
CFE mechanism assigns M .
3. The CRE and the RSD mechanisms for ha are equivalent.
Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) had already shown that the RSD mechanism is ex-post
Pareto optimal, i.e., the final matching that is chosen by the RSD lottery is Pareto optimal.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) showed that the RSD mechanism, however, is not ex-ante
or ordinally efficient (Pareto optimal), i.e., for some lotteries chosen by the RSD mechanism
there exist Pareto dominating lotteries (with stochastic dominance being used to formulate
the dominance relation). They also suggested a new random mechanism, the Probabilistic
Serial mechanism, that satisfies ex-ante efficiency.
3.3 Strategic results: strategy-proofness
As in Section 2.1, a mechanism for which no single applicant can ever benefit from misrep-
resenting her preferences is called strategy-proof (i.e., in game-theoretic terms, it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each applicant to report her true preference list). All mechanisms
introduced so far in this section are strategy-proof, as the following results indicate.
Theorem 15 (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). The SD mechanisms for ha are strategy-
proof.
Theorem 16 (Roth, 1982a). The Core mechanism for hm is strategy-proof. Hence, all CFE
mechanisms for ha are strategy-proof.
In addition, the Core and CFE mechanisms are group strategy-proof (i.e., no coalition of
applicants can jointly misrepresent their true preferences in order for at least one member of
the coalition to improve, whilst no other coalition member is worse off; see, e.g., Svensson,
1999). Strategy-proofness is also one of the properties that characterise the Core mechanism.
Theorem 17 (Ma, 1994). The Core mechanism for hm is the only mechanism that is Pareto
optimal, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
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Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999) extended Ma’s characterisation result to a mixed
model that combines ha and hm: in the House Allocation problem with Existing Tenants, a
subset of applicants initially owns a house. They defined mechanisms that combine elements
of SD as well as Core mechanisms based on the so-called YRMH-IGYT (You Request My
House – I Get Your Turn) algorithm. All YRMH-IGYT mechanisms are strategy-proof,
Pareto optimal, and individually rational (in the sense that no existing tenant receives a
house inferior to his own).
In Section 2.1 we introduced sc as a one-sided preference variant of hr, but we could also
introduce this class of problems as a variant of ha with the additional properties that objects
(i.e., houses/schools) have priorities over students, and objects can be multiply assigned up
to some capacity. Either way, the RGS mechanism can be used to find a matching for each
instance of sc. This mechanism is then strategy-proof (by Theorem 9) and stable (Gale and
Shapley, 1962), but it is not Pareto optimal. In fact, no mechanism is both stable and Pareto
optimal (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999). However it turns out that no other stable mechanism
would do better in the following sense.
Theorem 18 (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999). The RGS mechanism for sc Pareto dominates
any other stable mechanism.
Finally, when focusing on strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality only, no better mech-
anism than the RGS mechanism emerges.
Theorem 19 (Kesten, 2010). The RGS mechanism for sc is not Pareto-dominated by any
other Pareto optimal mechanism that is strategy-proof.
3.4 Further algorithmic results
3.4.1 Pareto optimal matchings
For a given instance of ha, Pareto optimal matchings may have different sizes, as il-
lustrated by Figure 1(a): for the instance I1 shown, matchings M1 = {(a1, h1)} and
M2 = {(a1, h2), (a2, h1)} are both Pareto optimal. In many applications we seek to match
as many applicants as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a Pareto optimal
matching of maximum size, which we refer to as a maximum Pareto optimal matching.
Towards an algorithm for this problem, Abraham et al. (2004) gave a characterisation
of Pareto optimal matchings in a given ha instance I. A matching M in I is maximal if
there is no pair (ai, hj) ∈ E, both of which are unassigned in M . Also M is trade-in-free
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a1 : h1 h2 a1 : h1 h2 h3 a1 : h1 h3
a2 : h1 a2 : h1 h2 h3 a2 : h2 h1
a3 : h1 h2 h3 a3 : h2
Figure 1: (a) ha instance I1 (b) ha instance I2 (c) ha instance I3
if there is no pair (ai, hj) ∈ E such that hj is unassigned in M , and ai is assigned in M
and prefers hj to M(ai). Finally M is cyclic coalition-free if M admits no cyclic coalition,
which is a sequence of applicants C = 〈ai0 , ai1 , . . . , air−1〉, for some r ≥ 2, all assigned in M ,
such that aij prefers M(aij+1) to M(aij) (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) (with subscripts taken modulo r).
Abraham et al. gave the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a matching to be
Pareto optimal in terms of these concepts:
Proposition 20 (Abraham et al., 2004). Let I be an instance of ha and let M be a matching
in I. Then M is Pareto optimal if and only if M is maximal, trade-in-free and coalition-free.
Moreover there is an O(m) algorithm for testing M for Pareto optimality, where m is the
number of acceptable applicant–house pairs in I.
Abraham et al. also gave a three-phase algorithm for finding a maximum Pareto optimal
matching in I, with each phase enforcing one of the conditions for Pareto optimality given
in Proposition 20. In Phase 1 they construct a maximum matching M in the underlying
graph of I, which is the bipartite graph with vertex set A ∪ H and edge set E. This step
can be accomplished in O(
√
n1m) time and ensures that M is maximal. Phase 2 is based on
an O(m) algorithm in which assigned applicants repeatedly trade in their own house in M
for any preferred vacant house. Once this step terminates, M is trade-in-free. Finally, cyclic
coalitions are eliminated during Phase 3, which is based on an O(m) implementation of the
TTC algorithm. Putting these three phases together, they obtained the following result.
Theorem 21 (Abraham et al., 2004). Let I be an instance of ha. A maximum Pareto
optimal matching in I can be found in O(
√
n1m) time, where n1 is the number of applicants
and m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs in I.
3.4.2 Popular matchings
Pareto optimality is a fundamental solution concept, but on its own it is a relatively weak
property. A stronger notion is that of a popular matching . Intuitively a matching M in an
ha instance I is popular if there is no other matching that is preferred to M by a majority
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of the applicants who are not indifferent between the two matchings. This concept was first
defined by Ga¨rdenfors (1975) (using the term majority assignment) in the context of smi.
To define the popular matching concept more formally, let M,M ′ ∈M, and let P (M,M ′)
denote the set of applicants who prefer M to M ′. We say that M ′ is more popular than M ,
denoted M ′  M , if |P (M ′,M)| > |P (M,M ′)|. Define a matching M ∈ M to be popular
(Abraham et al., 2007b) if M is -maximal (i.e., there is no other matching M ′ ∈ M such
that M ′ M).
Clearly a matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching M ′ such that
|P (M,M ′)| = 0 and |P (M ′,M)| ≥ 1. Hence a popular matching is Pareto optimal. However
in contrast to the case for Pareto optimal matchings, an ha instance need not admit a popular
matching. To see this, consider the ha instance I2 shown in Figure 1(b). It is clear that a
matching in I2 cannot be popular unless all applicants are assigned. The unique matching
up to symmetry in which all applicants are assigned is M = {(ai, hi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3}, however
M ′ = {(a2, h1), (a3, h2)} is preferred by two applicants, which is a majority. The relation 
in this case cycles, hence the absence of a -maximal solution (therefore, in general,  is
not a partial order on M).
The potential absence of a popular matching in a given ha instance can be related all
the way back to the observation of Condorcet (1785) that, given k voters who each rank n
candidates in strict order of preference, there may not exist a “winner”, namely a candidate
who beats all others in a pairwise majority vote. See also Chapter 2 (Zwicker, 2015).
Abraham et al. (2007b) derived a neat characterisation of popular matchings, leading
to an O(m) algorithm to check whether a given matching M in I is popular. The same
characterisation also led naturally to an O(n+m) algorithm for finding a popular matching
or reporting that none exists, where n = n1 + n2. We remark that popular matchings in I
can have different sizes, and the authors showed how to extend their algorithm in order to
find a maximum popular matching without altering the time complexity. This discussion
can be summarised as follows.
Theorem 22 (Abraham et al., 2007b). Let I be an instance of ha. There is an O(n + m)
algorithm to find a maximum popular matching in I or report that no popular matching
exists, where n is the number of applicants and houses, and m is the number of acceptable
applicant–house pairs.
A more complex algorithm, with O(
√
nm) complexity, can be used to find a maximum
popular matching in I or report that no popular matching exists, in the case that preference
lists include ties (Abraham et al., 2007b).
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McDermid and Irving (2011) showed that the set of popular matchings in an ha instance
can be characterised succinctly via a structure known as the switching graph. Using this
representation they showed that a number of problems can be solved efficiently, including
counting popular matchings, sampling a popular matching uniformly at random, listing all
popular matchings and finding various types of “optimal” popular matchings.
As a given ha instance need not admit a popular matching, it is natural to weaken the
notion of popularity, and seek matchings that are as popular as possible in cases where a
popular matching does not exist. To this end, McCutchen (2008) defined two versions of
near-popular matchings, namely a least unpopularity factor matching and a least unpopularity
margin matching. Also Kavitha et al. (2011) studied the concept of a popular mixed matching,
which is a probability distribution over matchings that is popular in a precise sense.
3.4.3 Profile-based optimal matchings
Further notions of optimality are based on the profile p(M) of a matching M in an ha
instance I. Informally, p(M) is an r-tuple whose ith component is the number of applicants
who have their ith-choice house, where r is the maximum length of an applicant’s preference
list.
A matching M is rank-maximal (Irving et al., 2006) if p(M) is lexicographically maxi-
mum, taken over all matchings inM. Intuitively, in such a matching, the maximum number
of applicants are assigned to their first-choice house, and subject to this condition, the
maximum number of applicants are assigned to their second-choice house, and so on. A
rank-maximal matching need not be of maximum cardinality. To see this, consider the
ha instance I3 in Figure 1(c) and the following matchings in I3: M1 = {(a1, h1), (a2, h2)}
and M2 = {(a1, h3), (a2, h1), (a3, h2)}. Clearly M1 is rank-maximal and |M1| = 2, whereas
|M2| = 3.
In many applications we seek to assign as many applicants as possible. With this in mind,
consider M+, the set of maximum matchings in a given ha instance I. A greedy maximum
matching is a matching M ∈M+ such that p(M) is lexicographically maximum, taken over
all matchings in M+. Both rank-maximal and greedy maximum matchings maximise the
number of applicants with their sth-choice house as a higher priority than maximising the
number of those with their tth-choice house, for any 1 ≤ s < t ≤ r. As a consequence, both
of these types of matchings could end up assigning applicants to houses relatively low down
on their preference lists.
Consequently, define a generous maximum matching to be a matching M ∈ M+ such
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that pR(M) is lexicographically minimum, taken over all matchings in M+, where pR(M)
is the reverse of p(M). That is, M is a maximum cardinality matching that assigns the
minimum number of applicants to their rth-choice house, and subject to this, the minimum
number to their (r − 1)th-choice house, and so on.
We collectively refer to rank-maximal, greedy maximum and generous maximum match-
ings as profile-based optimal matchings. Returning to instance I3 shown in Figure 1(c), the
matching M2 defined above is the unique maximum matching and is therefore both a greedy
maximum matching and a generous maximum matching.
The following results indicate the complexity of the fastest current algorithms for con-
structing rank-maximal, greedy maximum and generous maximum matchings in a given ha
instance.
Theorem 23 (Irving et al., 2006). Let I be an instance of ha. A rank-maximal matching
M in I can be constructed in O(min(n1 + r
∗, r∗
√
n1)m) time, where n1 is the number of
applicants, m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs, and r∗ is the maximum
rank of an applicant’s house in M .
Theorem 24 (Huang and Kavitha, 2012). Let I be an instance of ha. A greedy maximum
matching M in I can be constructed in O(r∗
√
nm log n) time, where n is the number of
applicants and houses, m is the number of acceptable applicant–house pairs, and r∗ is the
maximum rank of an applicant’s house in M . The same time complexity holds for computing
a generous maximum matching.
The algorithms referred to in Theorems 23 and 24 are also applicable in the more general
case that preference list contain ties.
4 Concluding remarks and further reading
In this chapter we have tried to cover some of the most important results on matching
problems with preferences. However the literature in this area is vast, and due to space
limitations, we could only cover a subset of the main results in a single survey chapter.
Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015) introduces some of our matching problems within the context
of fair resource allocation, namely, object allocation problems (ha), priority-augmented object
allocation problems (sc), and matching agents to each other (smi and hr). The following
non-exhaustive list of articles contains normative results for these problems and basic axioms
of fair allocation as introduced in Chapter 11 (Thomson, 2015) (e.g., resource-monotonicity,
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population-monotonicity, consistency, converse consistency): Ehlers and Klaus (2004, 2007,
2011); Ehlers et al. (2002); Ergin (2000); Kesten (2009); Sasaki and Toda (1992); Toda
(2006).
One obvious omission has been the Stable Roommates problem (sr), a non-bipartite
generalisation of sm. However a wider class of matching problems, known as hedonic games,
which include sr as a special case, are explored in Chapter 15 (Aziz and Savani, 2015).
Looking ahead, it seems likely that the level of interest in matching under preferences
will show no sign of diminishing, and if anything we predict that this field will continue to
grow. This is due in no small part to the exposure that the research area has had on a
global stage following the award of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Alvin Roth and
Lloyd Shapley in 2012. Another contributing factor is the increasing engagement by more
and more elements of society in forms of electronic communication, thereby easing preference
elicitation and centralisation of allocation processes.
To conclude, we give some sources for further reading. For more details on structural and
algorithmic aspects of sm, hr and sr, we recommend Gusfield and Irving (1989). The second
author’s monograph (Manlove, 2013) provides an update to Gusfield and Irving (1989) and
also expands the coverage to include ha. It expands on the algorithmic results presented in
this chapter in particular. For more depth from an economic and game-theoretic viewpoint,
the reader is referred to Roth and Sotomayor (1990), which considers issues of strategy in sm
and hr in much more detail, and also covers monetary transfer and the Assignment Game.
Finally, more recent results that also include economic applications (e.g., school choice and
kidney exchange) are reviewed by So¨nmez and U¨nver (2011) and Vulkan et al. (2013).
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